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In Australia, as in many other nations, the ageing of the population,
coupled with other social and demographic changes, has underpinned
significant growth in aged care in recent years, a development that is
projected to continue during the first half of the 21st century.1 At the
same time, there has been an increasing recognition by government
and aged care service providers that most older people wish to remain
within their own home and remain independent as much and for as
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G. Meagher & S. Goodwin, Sydney University Press, Sydney.
1 In 1970, 8.3 percent of the Australian population was 65 years and older, while
0.5 percent was 85 years and older. By 2010, this had risen to 13.5 percent and 1.8
percent respectively; by 2030 it is projected to be 19.3 percent and 2.7 percent, and
by 2050 to be 22.7 percent and 5.1 percent (Treasury 2010, p. 10). The growth in
aged care, however, arises from a range of factors other than simply more people
needing care, including greater participation of women in the workforce with its
effects on the number of informal (unpaid) carers, and the greater wealth and
political activity of older people relative to past generations. In Australia, the
growth of the aged care industry may accelerate after the announcement in April
2012 that the number of funded aged care places will be significantly increased
over the next decade (Australian Government 2012).
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long as possible (ageing-in-place), rather than go into residential care
(such as a nursing home).2 This has led in recent years to significant
‘de-institutionalisation’ of older people needing care (AIHW 2001, pp.
96–139). In this context, community aged care, which provides care
services to people in their own home and community3 has experienced
particularly high growth and is destined to become a major human ser-
vices growth industry in future years (Productivity Commission 2008,
2011).
Alongside these developments, the growing political dominance of
neoliberalism (Davidson 2012; Stilwell 2005; Nevile 1998) has led to
provision of most human services becoming increasingly marketised
over the last two decades. This is reflected in the use of a wide range of
market mechanisms to distribute government funding and determine
who will provide funded services; a greater emphasis on the right of
service users (as ‘consumers’) to choose their services and providers;
an increasing obligation on users to make a financial contribution to
the cost of services; a greater focus on efficiency in the production of
services; and the delivery of many government-funded services by non-
government (or ‘third party’) providers, both non-profit organisations
(NPOs) and privately owned ‘for-profit’ organisations (FPOs). Another
aspect of neoliberalism during this period has been the increased pres-
sure on governments to limit public expenditure, a factor with added
salience in aged care given the need to ensure that services will be finan-
cially sustainable as the population ages in the coming decades. These
themes, reflected in contributions to this volume, are all relevant to
community aged care in Australia.
As the marketisation of human services has continued apace, a ma-
jor issue in many sectors has been its impact on the supply side of
services, both at the level of individual providers and at a systemic level.
One important aspect of this has been a focus on the types of organi-
sations that have emerged as providers, and whether different types of
2 The term ‘ageing-in-place’ is also used where someone remains in the same
retirement village or nursing home as they age and their care needs increase.
3 In Australia, these services have been known as community care, but other
names are used elsewhere, such as domiciliary care or home care. In the United
Kingdom ‘community care’ is used to refer to both domiciliary care and residential
care.
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providers differ in their capacity to achieve the core objectives of the
services, namely that the services are high quality and responsive to
user needs (effectiveness), accessible to all people who need them (eq-
uity), and make the best use of available resources (efficiency). Within
this context there is concern that trends such as the increasing presence
of FPOs, the effect of ‘new public management’ on government agen-
cies (MacDermott 2008), the ‘corporatisation’ of many NPOs, the ever-
growing presence of large providers, and the pressures on all providers
to compete to remain viable, will lead to an excessive focus by providers
on efficiency, growth and profits, rather than on the individual needs
of each service user and ensuring the best services and outcome for all
users.
This chapter examines how these processes have played out in
terms of who provides paid community aged care services in Australia,
and is thus a case study of how the structure of one human services sec-
tor has evolved under marketisation. After giving a brief overview of
the current structure (the present) (based on Davidson, 2011), it exam-
ines why that structure has emerged (the past) and how it may change
(the future). This account points to some distinctive features of this in-
dustry that illustrate important aspects of the impact of marketisation
more generally in relation to how and why certain kinds of organisa-
tions may become prominent in the provision of human services and
the potential implications of this for service users.
These questions are examined from the perspective of service
providers, drawing on an economic framework that is based on indus-
trial organisation theory,4 but which also takes account of the special
features of human services and the major political and social forces that
have shaped the industry in the past and are likely to shape it in the fu-
ture. Much of the discussion here is framed in terms of understanding
how the ‘markets’ for community aged care function, but it is important
to note that there are more fundamental questions about the validity
of using markets in the organisation and delivery of aged care, given,
4 Industrial organisation is ‘the broad field within microeconomics that focuses
on business behaviour and its implications both for market structures and
processes, and for public policies toward them’ (Schmalensee & Willig 1989, p. xi),
or ‘the study of the structure of firms and markets and their interactions’ (Carlton
& Perloff 2005, p. 782).
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for example, the dangers in the ‘commodification of care’ (Himmelweit
2008; Ungerson & Yeandle 2007) whereby personal and relationship
values are replaced by ‘care’ as a tradeable product.
The chapter draws in part on my own current research into the
community aged care industry in New South Wales (NSW) as a case
study of the impact of contestability on human services providers.5 In
particular it draws on my analysis of funding data for one of the major
funding programs (the Commonwealth government's community care
packages6) and on 43 interviews with senior representatives of fund-
ing agencies, industry bodies, and providers between October 2009 and
March 2011. These interviews included 30 with CEOs, owners or senior
managers of 22 providers in NSW, including eight of the nine major
providers that together receive over 40 percent of the funds for com-
munity aged care in the state. While much of the data used here is from
NSW, and there are some differences between states in the structure
and functioning of the industry, this state in many respects reflects the
situation in other states. Moreover, given that it is the most populous
Australian state and has around one-third of national community aged
care funding and clients (SCRGSP 2011), it is a major part of the overall
national picture.
Community aged care in Australia is currently in a state of flux
following major changes to funding programs announced since 2011.
The research reported here was largely conducted before 2011, but the
industry structures and processes described remain fundamentally in
place. As the chapter shows, however, much of that is likely to change
in the next few years.
The community aged care industry (the present)
Community aged care is now a substantial industry in Australia, the
value of which was around $4 billion in 2010, including at least $3.2
billion from government funding (SCRGSP 2011). The industry is very
5 Ethics approval for the research was obtained from the University of New
South Wales.
6 The funding data is in Excel format by individual provider for each of service
outlet in Australia for each year from 2002–3 to 2010–11 (DoHA 2003, 2010a).
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diverse, in terms of the sources of demand, the range of service types,
and the types of services providers.
The demand for community aged care – who needs care and who
pays?
The majority of care provided to older people living at home is unpaid
care (‘informal care’) from relatives and friends (ABS 2010). However,
paid care may be needed to supplement informal care or where there
is no informal carer,7 and at least one-third of the 2.1 million people
in Australia who are aged 70 years or older receive paid care (SCRGSP
2011, pp. 13, 28). There is a wide diversity among older people in both
their need for paid community care (for example in terms of the level
of need and personal agency arising from frailty or disability, the types
of services they require, the need for other services, availability of in-
formal care, and cultural and language background) and their financial
capacity to pay for or contribute to the cost of services.
From an economic perspective, the ‘demand’ for any service is a
function of ‘need’ backed by ‘purchasing power’ (or money to pay for
the service). With community aged care, as with human services more
broadly, many people needing care are not able to pay for it and much of
the purchasing power must come from government.8 Over time, in re-
7 Note that the term ‘carers’ is used for those who give informal care, while
‘care-workers’ refers to paid staff.
8 Within the context of purchaser–provider models, which underpin the
marketisation of human services, the level of government funding determines the
demand for services. In this context, there may be ‘unmet need’ either because of
‘unmet demand’ (arising from input or organisational constraints on supply, such
as a shortage of staff, even though there are funds available to pay for services)
and/or because of inadequate funds to meet all the needs of older people (demand
constraints). In recent debates on aged care, limits on government funding are
commonly described as ‘controls on supply’, but this overlooks the nature – and
intent – of a purchaser–provider model, a distinction that is important in
analysing the role of government in a managed market. In fact, industry-wide,
there currently appears to be no major supply constraints in community aged care,
given that the main ‘input’ is staff time and the current workforce is under-utilised
(Martin & King 2008; Productivity Commission 2011; Mears 2012) with ‘workers
wanting … more hours far outnumber[ing] those wishing to work fewer hours’
(Howe et al. 2012, p. 87). There are, of course, long-term and some localised
concerns about the availability of sufficient care-workers.
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sponse to the diversity of need, Commonwealth and state governments
in Australia have introduced an extensive array of government-funded
community aged care programs. In addition, a range of other non-
government sources of funding have emerged. This has led, from the
perspective of service providers, to the development of a number of
market segments. Table 6.1 shows these segments, which fall into two
main ‘arenas’ of competition.
The first arena consists of an array of government-funded pro-
grams where a government agency plays at least some part in choosing
the possible provider(s) for a designated group of users. The core of
the industry is based on two of these programs, the Home and Com-
munity Care program (HACC, $1.9 billion in 2009–10), and the Com-
monwealth government’s community care ‘packages’ ($0.8 billion)
(SCRGSP 2011, p. 13, 16) which together provide over 80 percent of
government funding and over two-thirds of the total revenue of all
providers in the industry. HACC, which was established in 1985 and
caters for a lower level of need, funds a multiplicity of block grants for
different types of services in each local area, with providers essentially
determining the eligibility of users on the basis of common guidelines.
The community care packages, which were introduced in 1992 and
cater for people with a higher level of need equivalent to those in res-
idential care, operate via a two-part process whereby an independent
Aged Care Assessment Team (ACAT) determines the eligibility of an
older person and the level of assistance he/she can receive; and (by a to-
tally separate process), a limited number of providers in each region are
allocated a maximum number of users at each level that they can assist.9
The second arena includes an array of situations in which service
users (or an agent on their behalf) select their own provider using
their own funds or funds that have been previously allocated to them
from another (government or non-government) source. This includes a
subcontracting segment whereby some funded providers sub-contract
care-workers from other providers. It also includes an unsubsidised
9 The term ‘community care packages’ collectively describes the Community
Aged Care Packages (CACP), Extended Aged Care in the Home (EACH) and
EACH Dementia (EACH D). CACPs are for people whose needs are assessed as
equivalent to low-level residential care, while EACH and EACH D are for people
with needs equivalent to high-level residential care.
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(fee-for-service) segment where people buy services without any gov-
ernment subsidy, either because they are not eligible for a government
program; or because they are eligible but on a waiting list, or wanting
more hours, or wanting to avoid government.
It is important to note that community aged care is unusual
amongst human services in the range of sources of revenue for
providers for the core service, both in terms of the number of separate
government programs and the existence of services that operate with
no government funding.10 As discussed later, this diversity of revenue
sources underpins a number of the distinctive features of this industry.
Market mechanisms are used to allocate the available funds for each
of the government programs, and thus all operate as managed markets
(quasi-markets).11 In this context, three forms of managed market are
relevant, namely (i) where government chooses a monopoly provider
for each type of service or group of users in a given area, generally via
competitive tendering and contracting (CTC); (ii) a quasi-voucher li-
censing (QVL) system, where users themselves can choose from any
licensed provider, with the cost largely subsidised by government, and
which is more akin to a conventional market;12 and (iii) a hybrid of the
CTC and QVL systems, with licensed providers having to go through
a CTC process that limits the number of providers from which users
can choose and where the funding agency (at least to some extent) de-
termines the market share of providers. Historically, CTC systems were
10 For example, with government funding, in Australia there is only one source
for residential aged care, child care is funded via two linked levels of contributions
to parents, and the core funding for schooling comes from one state and one
federal agency. Virtually all these services have some level of government funding
or subsidy.
11 Davidson (2012) sets out a framework of possible market regimes in which
human services are delivered, encompassing both conventional markets where
users pay for their own services, and managed markets, where government is the
major source of purchasing power for services. A discussion of the differences
between the various types of managed markets can be found in Davidson (2008,
2009, 2011).
12 QVL systems encompass what are commonly called ‘consumer choice’ or
‘demand-side-funding’ models, and include ‘cash-for-care’ (Ungerson & Yeandle
2007) and ‘individual budgets’ (Wilberforce et al. 2011). In QVL systems, the
government subsidy may be paid by cash vouchers, tax deductions or
reimbursement of the provider (Davidson 2008).
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Table 6.1: Sources of demand for community aged care in Australia: arenas of
competition and market segments. For sources and notes, see appendix at the end
of the chapter
Arena and market segment Examples of program / buyer
Arena A – Government-funded CTC and hybrid programs
1 HACC
– funding and administration by
Commonwealth
– prior to 2012, funding was jointly
by states and the Commonwealth,
with administration by states
(ADHC in NSW)
HACC – (Home and Community
Care program)
CACP (Community Aged Care
Package)
EACH (Extended Care at Home)
2 Community care packages
– funding and administration by
Commonwealth
EACH Dementia (EACH D)
NCRP (National Carers Respite
Program)
Commonwealth Respite Centres
3 Other Commonwealth community
care programs
Assistance with Care and Housing
for the Aged
Veterans’ Home Care4 Dept Veterans Affairs (DVA)
– programs for war veterans
Veterans’ Home Nursing
Multi-Purpose Services (integrated
residential and community care
services in rural areas (Common-
wealth)
5 Mixed Delivery Programs
– funded by Commonwealth and
state
– in NSW, delivered by NSW
Health Transition Packages (Common-
wealth) and Compacks (NSW)
– short-term care for people
leaving acute health care
Markets, Rights and Power in Australian Social Policy
198
Arena and market segment Examples of program / buyer
Arena B – Individual Selection of Providers (a)
Attendant care (currently mainly
disability)
6 Quasi-voucher licensing (QVL)
models(b)
– government funding/ user choice
of provider
Productivity Commission (2011)
proposal
7 Sub-contracting from government-
funded services (also known as
‘brokering’)
Providers that have been funded
under programs in Segments 1–5
NSW Office of Protective Commis-
sioner (OPC)
NSW Long Term Care Support
Agency (LCSTA)
8 Guardianship and insurance (com-
pensable) arrangements (c)
Other insurance and compensation
payments
NPOs (additional to government
funding)
FPOs (e.g. for employees with aged
parents) (d)
9 Funded by non-government bodies
(NPOs and FPOs)
Paid through NPOs (e.g. Claims
Convention) (e)
People approved for Segments 1–5,
but either on a waiting list or want-
ing more (‘top-up’) hours
10 Unsubsidised individuals
People not approved for Segment
1–5
most likely to be used in the early years of marketisation, but with the
greater emphasis in recent years on the need for users to have choice
and some power over their services, QVL and hybrid systems are in-
creasingly being used (Davidson 2012).
In the Australian aged care system there are virtually none of the
QVL (‘choice’) models, although such a system was recommended by
the Productivity Commission (2011). HACC uses CTC or hybrid sys-
tems to determine who receives the block grants, although ‘direct al-
location’ by the department without any formal competitive process
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is often used in NSW to minimise the transaction costs of tendering
where there is no obvious competitor for an existing provider; the com-
munity care packages use a hybrid system, and most other programs
use a CTC or hybrid system, to appoint a single provider or panel of
approved providers in each region. With all of the government pro-
grams, a user’s eligibility is based on his/her level of frailty or disability,
and there is no financial means test for basic eligibility, although an in-
come test is applied to determine the level of financial contribution by
the user. However, funding is significantly less than demand, with more
people approved for assistance than there are places, leading to waiting
lists (‘queues’) for places in most programs in most areas. For example,
the Productivity Commission (2011 Appendix E, p. 20) estimated that
the unmet need for packages in 2011 was 49 percent of current places.
In principle, with the Commonwealth community care packages
and some of the other programs, users can choose from the providers in
their region that have been allocated places, but with long waiting lists,
users must often take whatever they can get and thus the potential for
users to exercise choice is severely limited. In practice, a government
agency determines the total market share of each provider of packages
based primarily on an annual tendering round for places or funds.
Moreover, for both HACC and the packages, only growth funding is
contestable. Subject to a provider meeting its contractual and regula-
tory requirements, the places and dollars it has been allocated in earlier
years are never re-tendered, so that allocations received by a provider
in past years are effectively locked in as recurrent funding indefinitely
(Davidson 2012).
A major focus in the following sections is on the packages segment
for a number of reasons. First, it is the main object of the ambitions, if
not activity, of many community aged care providers. This is largely be-
cause, while the total funds from HACC are much larger, the packages
have much higher per user funding, with payments in 2009–10 rang-
ing from $15,000 to $49,000 annually compared to the mean cost of just
over $2000 for each HACC recipient (Productivity Commission 2011,
Appendix E, p. 3). The packages also support people with higher needs
and are thus of most interest to providers for whom social objectives are
paramount. Second, it is a good case study of how an industry has de-
veloped under marketisation. The current hybrid system of allocating
places has operated since the inception of packages in 1992, and despite
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the strong limits on contestability for funding, the segment is consid-
ered by most providers to be very competitive. Third, the packages have
been administered by the Commonwealth funding agency (the Depart-
ment of Social Services) that is now taking over HACC programs for
older people, and which will be increasingly responsible for community
aged care in the future.13 Fourth, it allows a comparison with another
related type of service (residential aged care) for which funding is also
allocated by DSS using the same basic system, and for which similar
data is available.
The supply of community aged care – who are the providers?
On the supply side there is a wide range of providers and types of
providers that differ, in organisational terms, in the form of ownership
(whether government, NPO, or FPO), scale (size), the scope of services
they provide, the geographical spread of their operations and the time
for which they have operated. There are several major groupings of
providers:
• Government: There are three main types of government providers,
namely (i) state government specialist home care agencies, although
only in NSW is such an agency still significant;14 (ii) local gov-
ernment, which has a larger role in some states (such as Victoria)
and in non-metropolitan areas; and (iii) state health departments,
which are becoming increasingly involved as healthcare transition
programs are expanded.
• Non-profits (NPOs): As a group, the religious and charitable NPOs
receive the most government funds, both nationally and in NSW.
These are mostly longstanding bodies with wide geographic cov-
13 The department has been called the Department of Social Services (DSS) since
September 2013, following the election of the Abbott Coalition Government.
Before that, it was called the Department of Health and Ageing (2001–03).
14 The NSW government’s Home Care Services (HCS) is the largest single
provider in NSW with an annual budget of over $200 million based solely on
community care (both aged and disability). HCS works primarily in HACC where
it is a dominant presence. It received 30 percent of the $552 million of HACC
funds in NSW in 2009–10, including 81 percent of the $179 million for HACC
personal care and domestic assistance services (NSW DHS 2010).
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erage that provide a range of services, both in aged care and in
other fields. A number are now large enterprises, run along corpo-
rate lines, but their size and scope also enable them to develop more
sophisticated models of care (Davidson 2011). The largest number
of providers, however, are the community-based NPOs, which are
mostly small and medium-size organisations limited to one area,
controlled and managed by local groups. These bodies, many of
which originated in the 1970s and 1980s, service either the broader
community, or a sub-group within the population, (such as Abo-
riginal and ethnic groups, and, more recently, GLBT [gay, lesbian,
bisexual and transsexual] groups). In general, they have a distinct
ethos, support base, and modus operandi from the larger religious
and charitable bodies (Lyons 2001).
• The for-profit organisations (FPOs) in the sector are almost entirely
small to medium-size organisations that are specialists in commu-
nity aged care. Virtually no publicly listed multi-service FPOs are
present15 – unlike residential aged care, health care, and child care
where they have become increasingly involved in recent years – al-
though some large companies have entered and left the sector in the
last decade. For example, Ramsay Health Care took over a small FPO
in 2004, reselling it in 2006 to a religious NPO.
Each of the market segments shown in Table 6.1 has a distinctive profile
in terms of these various types of providers, although most providers
operate in more than one segment and it is common for users to access
services from more than one segment, both at any one time and over
time as their needs change. The providers in the five segments in the
first arena (as shown in Table 6.1) are mainly NPOs, although NSW
Home Care Service (HCS) is the major provider of HACC services
in NSW. In both these major programs, especially HACC, there is a
multiplicity of local community-based NPOs that only operate in one
geographic area. The providers in the five segments of the second arena
are mainly FPOs, although some NPOs operate in these segments.
The two arenas are bridged by the extensive use of subcontracting by
15 As of June 2011, there were only two publicly listed FPOs providing packages
in Australia (both in Queensland), receiving a total of only $1.2 million (0.1
percent of the $872 million allocated for packages nationally).
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government-funded providers, with the effect that staff employed by
FPOs provide services for at least 20 percent of all users.
Table 6.2 shows the proportion of place provided by government,
NPO, and FPO providers in each state and Australia overall for the
Commonwealth community care packages in 2009–10.
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show the allocation of funds for the packages in
NSW in 2003 and 201016 in terms of ownership and how this changed
in recent years in this segment, which providers consider the most at-
tractive and competitive, and which has a profile of providers that is
most likely to be the pattern for the industry in the intermediate term.17
The major features to note are the substantial market share and contin-
uing growth of large religious and charitable NPOs, the larger number
of small local community-based NPOs, the limited role of government
providers, and the low share of government funds that is allocated di-
rectly to FPOs.
In a number of respects, the profile of providers in the industry
differs from that in community aged care in other nations and in a
number of other human services in Australia that have been marke-
tised. In particular, for a service directed at the broader population (as
distinct from services whose target group is based on socioeconomic
disadvantage, such as homelessness), FPOs have a low market share of
funded programs with virtually no large corporate FPOs. Why, does the
industry differ in this respect from community (domiciliary) care in
other nations (Brennan et al. 2012) when the service everywhere has a
similar basic production function? Why does it differ from residential
aged care in Australia (Table 6.4), when the same government agency,
processes and people are used to determine funding allocations as for
the community care packages? And why does it differ from child care
in Australia (Brennan et al. 2012), given that both sectors were substan-
tially reliant on community-based NPO providers two decades ago?
16 As at 30 June each year (DoHA 2003, 2010a).
17 An analysis of the major implications of these tables can be found in
Davidson (2011).
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The origins of the current profile of providers (the past)
The establishment of HACC in 198518 was a major watershed in the de-
velopment of the community aged care industry. HACC consolidated
and extended a number of state and national funding programs, and
brought more systematic planning and coordination of services, re-
placing a process of uncoordinated grant submissions by a planned
allocation of funding across each region (House of Representatives
1982, 1994, pp. 7–9). At that time, the mix of providers was not dis-
similar to today, except that the religious and charitable NPOs had only
relatively small-scale community care operations. However, HACC op-
erated essentially through a joint planning model between government
and providers, with FPOs initially excluded from applying for funds
for HACC services, and it was not until the introduction of the pack-
ages in 1992, which used competitive tendering, that a more marketised
approach was used in the sector. This section seeks to explain how
the industry has moved from there to the current profile of service
providers.
Economic theory from the field of industrial organisation, modi-
fied to take account of the reality where a human service is the ‘product’,
can help explain how and why the current profile has emerged. Two
broad groupings of factors are relevant in determining the incentives
for, and barriers to, entry of providers in any human services industry.
First, there are factors intrinsic to the type of service, stemming from
the nature of demand (the characteristics and needs of users) and the
production function (the resources and processes needed to produce
and distribute the product). Second, there are ‘location’ factors, notably
the geographical, historical, social, demographic, institutional, and po-
litical factors, along with key individuals, that may have an influence
from the national to local level and shape the industry, markets, and
service system in each place.19 The policies and actions of national and
state governments in relation to regulation and funding systems for the
18 A bipartisan House of Representatives (1982) report had recommended a
more ordered approach to government support for home care. The Hawke Labor
government, elected in March 1983, established HACC drawing substantially on
the recommendations of that report.
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industry are especially important. In turn, the operation of the industry,
markets, and providers that have derived from these two sets of factors,
constantly feeds back to influence future developments.
Path dependency and government funding
The history of a sector, especially where path dependency is strong,20
constrains and shapes its development; and where a sector is substan-
tially dependent on government funding, the form and extent of the
funding is obviously a critical determinant of the structure of the sector.
These two factors combine powerfully to form a critical parameter
for the profile of providers in the community aged care industry in
Australia. It was earlier noted that with both HACC and the packages,
generally only growth funding is contestable – and this has been the
case since both programs were established. Thus the large bulk of fund-
ing each year derives from the accumulation of decisions made in
previous years going back over for two decades or more.21 For example,
in the allocations for the three main types of packages (CACP, EACH
and EACH D) in NSW in 2009–10, 87 percent of funding derived from
decisions made in earlier years. This is a substantial barrier to entry for
new providers, but it also facilitates stability in the service system.
19 For example, a service system may be shaped at a national level by political
and cultural traditions (Esping-Anderson 1990), and at a local level by the
distance of a community from a major city. With globalisation, the distinctive
impact of international forces on each ‘location’ is also important.
20 ‘Path-dependency’ (Liebowitz & Margolis 1990, 1995; Bessant et al. 2006, p.
46, 82; Travers 2005, p. 89) refers to the power of established institutions and past
policies to shape and limit future policies and events. This goes beyond merely that
‘history matters’ and refers to past decisions and events that determine and limit
future options.
21 Some other government programs in the first arena have a provision for
regular re-tendering every few years, but this often does not occur and existing
funding and contracts are ‘rolled over’; or where there has been re-re-tendering, it
has led to little change in who are the providers. For example, the National Carers
Respite Program (NCRP) uses a hybrid system with competitive tendering to be
held every three years in each region. In practice, the funding for NCRP has
generally been rolled over with no re-tendering, and the one time there was
re-tendering (2005) is remembered by providers as being very disruptive and
costly, with very little change resulting.
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In this context, it is inevitable that many existing providers in the
funded programs will be longstanding and that the entry of new ones
will be limited. This leaves three questions to consider regarding the
current profile of funded providers, namely (i) what factors in the early
years of marketisation set the foundation for the current profile; (ii)
what has determined new entry and growth of providers in the funded
programs since then; and (iii) how is the growth of FPOs explained,
given the small share of government funding that they receive?
Earlier history
The stability of funding systems
The limits on changes in providers over time noted above are part of a
broader stability and continuity in the funding and administration of
government community aged care programs over the last quarter cen-
tury, especially when compared to the major changes imposed in that
period on some other human services in Australia, such as child care
and employment assistance. Since the establishment of HACC in 1985,
there has been a gradual evolution in the services and programs that
are available and the way in which they have been run, but currently
HACC remains a cornerstone of the industry as the largest government
program in terms of funding and client numbers, and in broad terms it
operates as it has since 1985.
Nevertheless, there has been an increasing, but gradual, marketi-
sation of the sector since 1985. Competitive tendering was introduced
with the packages in 1992 and then extended to HACC in the wake
of the Hilmer Report (1993) on competition policy; FPOs were able to
tender for packages, at least on a pilot basis, from the early years and for
HACC from 1998;22 funding agencies have continued to refine and ex-
tend tendering processes; and there has been some movement towards
various ‘consumer-directed care’ options.23 These changes, however,
have been introduced as a continuity with the past, and most programs
22 The actual date varied between states. The Amending Agreement between the
Commonwealth and New South Wales, which introduced this change, was signed
on 1 July 1998.
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now work in a similar way in regard to critical aspects in the opera-
tion of ‘the market’. Thus, in general, a government agency chooses the
providers; competitive tendering (and sometimes direct allocation) is
used rather thanQVL systems; and funds are paid to providers and ad-
ministered by them effectively as block grants, with cross-subsidisation
across clients a normal practice accepted by the funding agencies.
The ‘original’ providers
Given this stability and the lack of contestability for previously allocated
funding, the early days of HACC and the packages are particularly im-
portant in explaining the current profile of providers in the industry.
The current position of the major providers is based on their early start
in the industry, the continuing accretion of places in the annual fund-
ing round each year, and the consolidation of smaller providers within
the large NPOs.
Three points are particularly important from the period in which
HACC and the packages were established. First, HACC was established
before the marketisation of the industry,24 and many of today’s
providers, including virtually all the major ones, were operating even
before HACC began. Further, Australia has a long tradition of NPO
and voluntary provision of human services at a higher level than most
other nations (Davidson 2008; Lyons 2001), a tradition reinforced by
various government initiatives during the 1970s to support the devel-
opment of community-based NPOs. Thus when governments sought to
move out of direct provision, to ‘steer rather than row’ (Osborne & Gae-
bler 1993), it was much more likely that NPOs would play a key role.
In Sweden and the United Kingdom, marketisation began in a context
where community aged care services had been wholly provided by lo-
23 ‘Consumer-directed care’ is aimed at giving service users greater control over
the services they receive. In part this stems from long-standing human rights
objectives of social movements (Yeatman 1990), but it also has been driven from
another direction by the notion of consumer sovereignty that is central to
neo-classical economics.
24 While neo-liberalism began to impact from the mid-1970s, it did not
substantially affect human services in a number of nations including Australia
(MacDermott 2008) and the United Kingdom (Le Grand & Bartlett 1993) until the
late 1980s.
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cal government, and thus FPOs have subsequently taken a much bigger
share of government funding (Brennan et al. 2012; Meagher & Szebe-
hely 2013).
Second, FPOs were formally excluded from providing HACC-
funded services until 1998, (although some, such as Kincare, estab-
lished NPO arms that enabled them to move into HACC earlier than
that (Kincare 2007)). While they were able to apply for packages from
the early years (1992), FPOs had less opportunity to demonstrate their
capability in a field in which trust and reputation are critical.
The history of FPO access to this sector is indicative of some im-
portant broader processes in human services that remain relevant to
the present day. On the one hand, as outlined by Hansmann (1980,
1987) in his theory of ‘contract failure’, where there are strong asymme-
tries of information, buyers are more likely to rely on trust, and they
are more likely to trust NPOs because of their ‘non-distribution con-
straint’ (such that financial surpluses are not distributed to individual
shareholders).25 In human services there are major asymmetries of in-
formation arising from the limits on the personal agency and financial
capacity of many users, and on the measurability and observability of
the actual services (Blank 2000; Davidson 2012). Thus there is scope
for opportunist providers that are profit maximisers rather than so-
cial maximisers to reduce the quality and equity of services in order to
lower costs, and concern about this possibility in large part explains the
continuing concern about FPOs working in human services.
On the other hand, the history of FPO access illustrates the
changed environment and expectations created by neoliberalism and
marketisation. In 1985, the exclusion of FPOs appears to have been
considered largely unexceptional as ‘it was the culture then’ (interview
with government official) following the strong growth of, and gov-
ernment support for, NPOs, especially community-based ones, in the
1970s; problems with FPO nursing homes that had led to government
measures to encourage NPOs in aged care (Lyons 1995); and the fact
that publicly funded community care providers at the time of the es-
tablishment of HACC were government or NPOs. Then, after over a
decade of neoliberal dominance, the decision in 1998 to allow FPOs
25 See Davidson (2009) for a discussion of the limits to contract failure theory.
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into HACC was similarly considered unexceptional within govern-
ment. More specifically, there had been the Hilmer Report (1993) on
competition policy; a number of years during which FPOs had access
to the packages with few apparent problems; and the increasing accep-
tance of FPOs to deliver government programs in a range of fields. The
election of the conservative Howard government may have given some
impetus to admitting FPOs, but it was a bipartisan decision supported
by state Labor governments.26
Third, until the 21st century, community care was very much the
‘poor cousin’ of residential care. For some of the larger NPOs and FPOs,
residential care was their only interest, and they did not look to com-
pete seriously for the new stream of funding from packages until later.
Those who initially saw the opportunities gained a first-mover advan-
tage (Lieberman & Montgomery 1988), although even some of those
were initially persuaded primarily by the argument that it would assist
future residential business. The stability and form of the funding system
has undercut any second or late mover advantage.
The result of the above processes is that the NPOs have had time to
grow and consolidate without competition from aggressively market-
ing FPOs. In particular, the religious and charitable NPOs that operate
across a wide geographic area have had space to develop as large and
efficient operators now able to successfully compete in a more robust
competitive environment if required, while smaller community-based
NPOs have at least been able to retain their earlier funding, and, to
varying extents, have experienced some growth. This contrasts with
child care in Australia where there were few large NPOs when a QVL
system was introduced in the early 1990s (via both tax deductions and
benefits paid directly to parents) and FPOs subsequently took a major-
ity of the market (Brennan et al. 2012).
26 Interviewees for this study who had been government officials who were part
of the process at the time recalled that allowing FPOs in was not considered a
major issue amid other more significant changes to mechanisms in HACC for
planning, decision-making, and accountability.
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Entry and growth of providers in the funded programs
While funding from previous years is not contestable, new or ‘growth’
funding is continually made available, usually within annual funding
rounds for packages and HACC. Over time, there has been substantial
potential for new entrants and for existing ones to grow, with the real
value of funding more than doubling in the last decade (Davidson
2011).
Who has received this growth funding? And what factors explain
the types of organisations that have received the funding? While the al-
locations are the result of decisions made about tenders each year, these
largely flow from the broad framework and principles that underpin
the design and management of the regulatory and funding systems for
the programs. This section briefly examines the change in the alloca-
tion of total funding for packages in NSW between 2003 and 2010, and
whether there were factors in play that may have favoured certain types
of organisations.
Outcomes of the tendering process
The packages segment is considered by providers to be ‘very com-
petitive’, with the total number of new places in some regions each
year being less than 10 percent of the total number being sought by
providers in their tenders. There are no formal barriers to entry for any
provider in terms of ownership or size, although each one must be of
sufficient size such that it has the capability to meet the requirements to
become an approved provider. There has been both new entry and exit
of providers between 2003 and 2010. In 2010, 13 organisations from the
2003 list no longer provide services or have been absorbed into another
body, while there were 28 new ones. The main increases have been in
the number of FPOs. However the market share of the 114 providers in
2003 who remained in 2010 remained constant at 93 percent.
The major interest, however, relates to the growth of existing or-
ganisations, and the change in the market share of different types of
providers. The funding data reveals a number of features. First, while
the largest percentage increase went to FPOs, this was from a very small
base. The number of FPO providers has trebled in the period. After
eleven years of the packages, there were 6 FPOs with 2.7 per cent of to-
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tal funds (2003); seven years later, there were 18 with 7.1 per cent of
funds. Second, the providers receiving the largest absolute increase in
funds (and a percentage increase above the overall rate of growth) were
the religious and charitable NPOs. Third, the general community NPOs
have also grown substantially, but less than the overall rate of growth.
The lowest growth was for group-based community NPOs, a fact re-
flected in their common concern expressed in interviews that in recent
years, they have had difficulty in winning places but are then asked
by the larger providers to assist in working with their group. Fourth
(not shown in the tables), some individual community-based NPOs
have had major increases, reflecting their growth-oriented strategies
and innovative approaches. In summary, the major growth has been di-
rected to the large NPOs, FPOs have made substantial gains, and some
community-based NPOs have flourished, but the share of funding go-
ing to the smaller community-based NPOs has declined.
The reasons
A number of factors explain the above. First is the importance of in-
cumbency. In any industry, incumbency is a critical advantage for a
supplier and an important factor in explaining the structure of the
industry. An incumbent firm, especially one with longevity, has an
established infrastructure and networks for the production and distri-
bution of its products, a reputation and trust through demonstrated
performance over time, access to better information than new entrants
(Demsetz 1982) and brand loyalty. Its position will be further but-
tressed if buyers are risk-averse. Incumbency has some powerful addi-
tional benefits in community aged care, given the importance of trust.27
Governments, generally being risk-averse, will tend to stay with proven
performers even if there may be some reservations. For individual
users, changing care providers is a major emotional and logistical dis-
ruption, and they cannot be sure that a new one will be better than their
current one; this is not the same as changing toothpaste for a week’s
trial. Finally, the value of incumbency is further reinforced in the Aus-
27 However, trust and reputation may also be transferable from work in related
fields, where a long-standing NPO wishes to move into a sector, as is currently
occurring in community aged care.
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tralian community aged care industry given the long-term stability of
the funding systems.
A second issue is whether there is government support for certain
types of providers. In some jurisdictions, government or the funding
agency has an objective (possibly explicit, but often unspoken) to en-
courage the entry and growth of certain types of providers in terms of
ownership or size. In Australia, FPOs were excluded from HACC be-
fore 1998, and in Sweden in recent years, there has been a strong and
deliberate push to increase the presence of FPOs in aged care (Meagher
& Szebehely 2013). However, for HACC since 1998 and for all of the
other current community aged care programs in Australia from their
beginning, there appears to have been no explicit policy to promote cer-
tain types of providers, other than the aim of some agencies ‘to keep
a mix of large and small’. Nevertheless, it was clear from statements in
a number of interviews that some providers consider there are various
unspoken agendas in funding decisions and that, at least informally, de-
cisions unduly favour NPOs and large providers; ironically, others felt
that decisions are often aimed at ‘giving everyone something’.
Third, a high level of regulation generally favours larger and more
established providers, given the administrative and resource require-
ments it entails, while the limitations on profits that regulation implies
also reduces the incentives for some FPOs to enter. Arising from con-
cerns about both protecting vulnerable people and ensuring the best
use of government funds, the aged care industry has been subject to
increasing regulation, especially over the last 15 years from the Aged
Care Act (1997) on, while different requirements for each program im-
pose extra costs. In contrast, there is no industry-specific regulation
on providers in the unsubsidised segment of the industry (part of the
second arena in Table 6.1), nor in 2010 were there any specific require-
ments set by funding agencies regarding bodies that are subcontracted
other than that the funded provider must ensure they meet the require-
ments of their contract (Davidson 2011).
Fourth, the processes by which funding is determined will affect
the type of providers.28 Because of the resources it requires, tendering
favours larger and more established providers, and this is exacerbated
28 Clearly there are strong arguments that regulation and the information
required in tenders are a necessary cost in ensuring quality in a marketised system.
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where separate tenders are required for each program in each region.
The larger providers have the resources to support market research,
professional tender writers, and promotional activities to build a posi-
tive image – and thus trust – amongst the funding agencies. The process
of direct allocations commonly used in HACC in NSW partly avoids
these transaction costs and facilitates the growth of smaller
community-based providers, but it further reinforces the position of es-
tablished providers.
Fifth, the criteria by which tenders are decided affect the types of
providers chosen. There is much documentation setting out the for-
mal criteria, but my interviews with a range of stakeholders sought to
identify what they believed to be the crucial factors in practice.29 A gen-
erally positive picture emerged with the major focus in the packages
on the (i) quality of care, as reflected in the capability of staff, well-es-
tablished models of care, and systems to monitor quality; (ii) the scope
of services to ensure a better integrated experience for users; (iii) local
appropriateness, in terms of a knowledge of local needs and services,
established networks, and senior staff with local experience; (iv) the fi-
nancial and logistic viability of the organisation; and (v) the capacity to
begin the service quickly. While the scale of a provider’s operation may
not be a criterion per se, many of the factors are substantially depen-
dent on scale, thus favouring larger providers. There is no direct price
competition, with a fixed amount for each type of package set by the
department. Further, departmental staff explicitly rejected the idea of
some indirect price competition whereby a tenderer could gain an ad-
vantage simply by offering more places than what it was funded for, and
were insistent that any proposal had to be justified in terms of its effect
on the quality of care. (Providers could, of course, cut costs and reduce
quality once they have received allocations in order to increase their fi-
However, the aim here is not to debate that issue, but simply point out the
implications for the type of providers that emerge in the industry.
29 Providers can attend feedback sessions as to why they were unsuccessful in
tendering for packages. While providers had widely differing views on how useful
these sessions were, they are an insight into what was significant in funding
decisions. One common comment from providers was that high priority criteria
varied from year to year.
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nancial ‘surplus’ (or profit), but there are no obvious incentives to do
this to win funding).
In these ways, the system would appear to work towards selecting
social maximisers rather than profit maximisers, although there also
appeared to be limited focus on equity and discouraging cream-skim-
ming30 or on protecting the conditions for the low paid care-workers.
While most providers generally accepted that the outcome of the
process was a set of providers that gave quality care, they commonly
complained about the process that success mainly depended on how
well the tender was written (‘an essay-writing competition’) and very
little on actual first-hand knowledge of the quality of a provider’s cur-
rent care, and that it was rarely clear why the successful providers were
chosen over other good ones.
Taken together, the above factors suggest that established
providers, providers with size and scope, and NPOs are most likely to
succeed with tenders. However, through the emphasis on localisation
and demonstrated capability, the system also gives significant opportu-
nities to existing smaller local bodies, many of which have been able to
keep winning growth dollars; indeed, 74 percent of package providers
in NSW in 2010 operated in only one region. It also enables small and
medium-size FPOs that are not profit maximisers, who have been in the
sector for a number of years and developed a good reputation, to win
funding. On the other hand, the lack of price competition, high profits
and the opportunity to quickly get scale, reduces the incentive for some
FPOs to enter the sector, especially the larger corporates.
For-profit organisations in the industry
There are three significant features about the involvement of FPOs in
the community aged care industry in Australia – their low share of
direct funding from government programs; their prevalence in those
markets segments in the second arena of competition where providers
are chosen by or for individual users; and the fact that they are all small
30 Whereby providers avoid more difficult and resource-intensive users or
favour more affluent users who can pay a higher co-payment or buy extra services.
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and medium-sized enterprises, with no large corporate FPO presence
at this stage.
The low share of direct funding for FPOs from government pro-
grams is substantially explained above. The combined effect of the
strength of NPOs, concerns about FPOs giving priority to profits rather
than good services (as embodied in contract failure theory), low prof-
itability, and formal exclusion of FPOs from HACC for over a decade
were particularly powerful in the early years of marketisation in the
sector, and the first three of these factors remain important today.
Moreover, NPOs have shown limited interest in the segments in the
second arena, given that the segments in the first arena have the large
majority of revenue and cater for people with the highest need which is
consonant with the overall mission of most NPOs. Some NPOs provide
unsubsidised services, but this is usually limited to clients who are on
a waiting list or who want more hours and/or different services above
their government-funded entitlements. Some have gone a step further
and sought to develop a business that can subsidise their other services,
but some of these say that they ‘burnt their fingers’, finding that they
faced tighter margins which forced a mode of operation that did not al-
low them to assist clients as fully as they wanted. On the other hand,
FPOs, with little direct access to government funds, have been able to
use these segments to give themselves a good platform of business, es-
pecially through subcontracting.
The fact that currently most FPOs in the industry in NSW are small
and medium enterprises is explained by a number of factors. The own-
ers of many of these providers are ex-nurses or other people with a
human service background who want to work independently of large
bureaucratic organisations (whether government or NPO), and thus are
examples of the ‘dwarves of capitalism’, motivated primarily by a de-
sire for independence and good service rather than profit (Davidson
2009, p. 57; Marceau 1990). Some of these FPOs go back decades, oth-
ers are very recent, and new ones are always being established. Many
of today’s FPOs have emerged from this sort of beginning, including
some now very substantial ones that were begun by nurses on a part-
time basis with one or two clients. (Of course, a number of the FPOs
are profit maximisers and/or operated by people with no human service
background, while no industry-specific regulation of providers for un-
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subsidised services leaves the way open for more opportunist providers
to enter or emerge.)
The fact that people with limited capital have been able to start
their own business in this industry in a way that would not be possible
in many other human services is a result of the production function of
community aged care. At the most basic level, the provider of care for
an older person living at home needs no physical equipment, financial
outlay, or specialised skills to begin. There can be few industries with
so few barriers to initial entry. Allied with this is the fact that the ba-
sic service involves short periods of assistance (one to two hours) where
care-workers do things that most people do for themselves, and thus
staff with limited skills and training can be engaged at the margin as
additional hours are needed. These features of the production function
also facilitate the use of subcontracting and the development of fran-
chises. Clearly, if a provider wishes to grow and ensure consistent high
quality service for large numbers of users, it needs more substantial in-
frastructure, better training and conditions for staff, and economies of
scale and scope, but the ease of entry at a basic level of operation has
been a powerful reason for the past and continuing establishment of
small FPOs in the industry.
However, even a large-scale provider of community care does not
need property or the substantial initial capital that is necessary, for ex-
ample, with a nursing home or childcare centre (Access Economics
2009; Brennan & Newberry 2010). This critical feature of the produc-
tion function also helps explain the limited interest of large corporate
FPOs, whose interest in other human service sectors is based substan-
tially on the role of property, both as a source of profits and as a security
against operational and other risks, rather than the actual provision of
care.31 As well, there are other limits on the incentives for larger FPOs
to seek to enter this industry, given that the nature of the target group
31 Thus, for example, a nursing home can be seen as an investment in rental
property where there is a guaranteed high level of occupancy, rents are
underpinned by secure government funding and where there is an asset that can
be sold if the return is no longer considered satisfactory or the risk becomes too
high. On the other hand, property also involves costs, and currently the
regulations and cost structure in residential care makes that sector less attractive
for providers (Access Economics 2009), and make ‘community care more
profitable’ (Stewart Brown Business Solutions 2009).
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means there are limited profits to be made relative to other industries,
while under the current funding system (with previous allocations not
contestable) they cannot get scale. Notwithstanding that, the profitabil-
ity of community care is sufficient to attract smaller FPOs and retain
large NPOs, with packages estimated in 2009–10 to return at least seven
percent (profit as a proportion of total costs), and potentially 20 percent
for some providers (Stewart Brown Business Solutions 2009, 2010).
Possible changes
In addition to the substantial growth arising from the ageing of the
population and the increasing emphasis on ageing-in-place, the com-
munity aged care industry faces major change over the next decade
arising from two sets of government decisions. One is the transfer of
full responsibility for HACC services for older people (65 and over) to
the Commonwealth. The other is the decisions arising from the report
by the Productivity Commission (2011) of its inquiry, Caring for older
Australians. This section considers some possible impacts of these two
sets of decisions, which are likely to have profound effects on the struc-
ture and operation of providers in the industry.
Transfer of HACC for older people to the Commonwealth
In 2010, Council of Australian Governments (COAG) decided that the
Commonwealth would have full funding and administrative respon-
sibility for HACC for older people and the states would have similar
responsibility for HACC for people under 65 with a disability.32 This
was to be phased in, with the Commonwealth taking policy responsi-
bility from July 2011 and funding responsibility from July 2012, with an
agreement that there would be no significant change to the program be-
fore 2015. The key principle behind this change is that services should
32 The Council of Australian Governments is the meeting of heads of the
Commonwealth, six states and two territory governments in Australia. Since 1985,
the Commonwealth and states have jointly funded HACC and the states have
administered the programs.
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be client-centred and making one level of government responsible for
each of aged care and disability programs will facilitate integration of
the planning and delivery of services for each group.
One set of effects on providers will flow simply from the fact that
aged care will be the responsibility of only one level of government.
This will lead to changes aimed at achieving greater consistency be-
tween the states and closer linkages between the different forms of aged
care, while any further change will be much easier to achieve without
the need for negotiation and agreement with the states. Further, it has
already led to a different approach to allocating HACC funds than the
states currently use. State agencies have relied strongly on the input
of regional and local staff in deciding the allocation of funds, but the
Commonwealth currently does not have a presence in this field out-
side the capital cities and historically has been far more dependent on
formal tender processes (which, as noted earlier, tend to favour larger
providers).
Some major changes to HACC, both in the short term and ones to
apply after 2015, have now been announced (Australian Government
2012). The personal care services are to become a basic level of packages
and administered along those lines. The other elements of HACC will
be amalgamated with a number of other aged care programs to form a
new Home Support Program. These changes, along with the more gen-
eral effects noted above, are likely to substantially impact on the role
that small NPOs play in the operation of HACC.
One significant change in NSW that in part has been driven by the
transfer of HACC to the Commonwealth has been the decision by the
Liberal government, elected in 2011, to privatise NSW Home Care Ser-
vice (HCS) during 2015. HCS is currently the largest provider of HACC
services in NSW, with total revenue of $200 million from all sources.
Government response to the Productivity Commission Report
The Productivity Commission Report (2011) and the initial govern-
ment response (Australian Government 2012) were very wide-ranging
and it is not possible here to trace through all the possible implications
for the profile of providers in the community aged care industry.33 Two
key issues are considered below.
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The Productivity Commission (2011) recommended that sufficient
funding be made available to ensure that there is a place for all older
people eligible for assistance. The then government decided to phase
this in over the next decade by gradually increasing the number of aged
care places from 113 per 1,000 people aged 70 and over to 125 places by
2021–22. Alongside this, the major theme of the government response
was the importance of supporting people to remain at home as long as
possible and thus a higher proportion of these places will go to com-
munity rather than residential care. Given the current parameters (in
terms of population, levels of need and eligibility requirements) these
changes will go a long way to meeting, by 2022, the Productivity Com-
mission’s recommendation for sufficient places for all eligible people.
They will also lead to significant growth for providers, including those
in the subcontracting segment. It will also mean that, with fewer wait-
ing lists, users will have greater choice, and thus may lead to providers
having to do more to attract and retain clients.
The then government decided to defer a change that has the poten-
tial to have a major impact on providers. The Productivity Commission
(2011) proposed to replace the current hybrid system of funding pack-
ages with a QVL system, whereby all approved providers could freely
compete for clients on an ongoing basis. Both the former and current
governments have indicated support for this approach in the long-term,
but will conduct further analysis. There are no plans to implement such
a scheme in the short-term.
Such a system would give service users more apparent options, but
(as set out in Davidson 2012), it has a number of major dangers, both in
terms of ensuring the quality and efficiency of individual providers, and
ensuring stability, equity, efficiency, and quality at a systemic level. Such
problems have beset child care over the last decade, largely as a result
of this form of funding (Brennan & Newberry 2010; Press & Woodrow
2009).
In terms of the profile of providers, it would be likely to lead to
more FPOs and a greater market share for FPOs, which would be able
to compete directly for clients eligible for government assistance. It may
also increase the presence of large corporate FPOs, since they will be
33 The federal Labor government lost office in September 2013. The incoming
Coalition government has largely endorsed earlier decisions.
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able to obtain larger scale more quickly and can use their marketing ex-
perience to achieve this. It may also lead to either an excessive number
of providers, or conversely, if regulation is reduced, to greater concen-
tration of ownership.34 At the same time, however, it may also allow the
growth and survival of small specialist providers able to meet a niche,
either for groups or to provide a specialist service which can be pur-
chased by larger providers for their clients.
Nevertheless, the large NPOs are likely to remain dominant. They
have had the time to develop as strong corporate enterprises and should
be able to compete strongly in the marketplace that emerges. This has
been the case in Job Network, where the NPOs that had scale in similar
programs at the time of the introduction of Job Network have contin-
ued to grow. It contrasts with child care, where there were few large
NPOs when a QVL system was introduced and FPOs quickly took a
major share of the market, although those NPOs that did exist (such as
Kindergarten Union) have continued to flourish.
Conclusion
Community aged care in Australia is a diverse and complex industry,
and provides a useful study in how the structure of one human services
sector has evolved under marketisation, and the impact of marketi-
sation on the profile of providers. In community aged care in other
nations and in other human service sectors in Australia, there are nu-
merous examples of how marketisation has led to the extensive growth
of FPOs, the reduction of the role of NPOs and the end of the substan-
tial involvement of government providers. That this has not happened
here in this case is a result of a number of factors, notably the situ-
ation two decades ago at the time that marketisation took hold; the
subsequent relative stability of the funding system; limited incentives
for the entry of larger FPOs in terms of potential profits; the fact that
only growth funding has been contestable in the two major programs;
34 Previously, the Productivity Commission (2002, p. 11.5) has noted that the
introduction of such a system for funding employment assistance for
disadvantaged people under the then Job Network program would be likely to lead
to some ‘consolidation in the industry’.
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and the maintenance of close government control over the entry and
growth of providers via a tendering system where a major focus has
been on ensuring the quality of care.
Much of this may change, however, in the light of government
decisions both taken and still to come, especially if these lead to the
introduction of a QVL funding system for the major programs where
the users choose their providers and all funding is continuously con-
testable. In this context, the large NPOs are likely to retain their promi-
nent position, but there is likely to be an increase in the number of
FPOs, a greater concentration of market share, the appearance of large
FPOs, and a reduced market share and uncertain future for small
community-based NPOs.
The experience of community aged care in Australia has some
broader implications for human services. First, where there is long-
term stability of funding, history becomes more significant and the
first-mover advantage is especially significant. Second, the limits on the
entry and growth of FPOs in the early years of marketisation of this
service enabled NPOs to develop a strong presence and the capacity to
be successful in a robust competitive environment. Third, it shows that
tight government control of entry and contestability aimed at ensuring
quality services can co-exist with a system that maintains incentives to
improve quality and efficiency alongside strong competition between
providers. Fourth, it also shows the benefits of a process that closely
controls the entry of new providers so as to minimise the potential
problems arising from marketisation.
Change is going to happen in this industry in Australia. It is to be
hoped that this does not go too far down the marketisation track in
ways that remove some of the strong incentives and requirements for
quality in the current system. Whatever the change is, however, it will
be interesting as an experiment on the impact of government policy
and funding systems on different types of human service providers and
on the structure of human service industries – and the effects of this on
the quality of services and outcomes for users.
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Appendix
Sources and notes to Table 6.1.
(a) This includes services funded by government either indirectly (Sub-
contracting) or by QVL systems; and services organised by government
(Guardianship and Insurance Arrangements).
(b) The consumer-directed packages pilots started in 2011 are not in-
cluded here, but under the Commonwealth community care packages,
because the department selects providers to manage the packages, al-
beit under more direction by users.
(c) In these cases, government agencies assist people to obtain care that
is often paid for from their own funds. OPC supports both younger
people with a disability and older people. LCSTA is for people who
have received compensation payments for a road accident injury, and is
mainly used by people under 65 years old.
(d) This can include payments by companies to employees who have
aged parents. I have not identified any such schemes in Australia, but
they do operate in Europe (Snell, Fernandez & Bennetts 2007). (e) This
funding is compensation to survivors of the Nazi Holocaust paid by
various European governments, coordinated by the USA-based Claims
Conference, and distributed through Jewish Care in Australia. In 2012,
Australia received $3.8 million ($1.5 million in NSW), most of which
was for community aged care.
Sources to Table 6.2.
Derived from DoHA (2010b p. 29 Tables 9–11). Note that the relatively
high proportion and number of places held by state government
providers in Victoria and South Australia are primarily state health de-
partment agencies.
Sources to Table 6.3.
Derived from DoHA (2003). Note: The data cover only CACP, EACH,
EACH D packages. Some more recent minor specialised packages for
which there is a single provider. (For example, NSW Health has 100
percent of Transitional Health packages are not included).
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Sources to Table 6.4.
Derived from DoHA (2010a). Note: The data cover only CACP, EACH,
EACH D packages. Some more recent minor specialised packages for
which there is a single provider are not included (For example, NSW
Health has 100 percent of Transitional Health packages).
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